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The Universal Declaration and Developments
in the Enforcement of International Human
Rights in Domestic Law
MICHAEL VAN ALSTINE*

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights emerged in a time of
high-minded hope in the ability of aspirations to propel law and law
to control power. ―It is essential,‖ the Declaration thus proclaims,
―that human rights should be protected by the rule of law‖ as an
antidote, among other things, to the reactive violence justified by
―tyranny and oppression.‖1 This hope, however, was one tempered
by experience with the human tendency to contrary impulses, and in
particular by a painful familiarity with a half-century of near
―universal‖ warfare. The immediate historical context of the
Declaration, in other words, provided a blunt example of the capacity
of power to control law.
As they assembled in the aftermath of World War II, therefore, the
drafters of what became the Universal Declaration could have had
few illusions about the ability of words alone to constrain domestic
tyrants. The United Nations itself had few institutions or mechanisms for immediate enforcement, and none of any practical
significance for individuals with particularized grievances. With this
background, any bold attempt to declare immediately applicable
international human rights ―law‖ risked an appearance of detachment
from the realities of law enforcement. As a founder of the U.S.
American constitutional system had observed over a century and a
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., para. 3, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
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half earlier, ―[i]f there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact,
amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.‖2
Certainly aware of such sentiments, the drafters of the Universal
Declaration opted for a longer-term perspective. They did not set as
the goal of the enterprise the creation of conventional legal norms for
immediate enforcement by state or even international institutions.
The animating spirit of the Universal Declaration was instead one of
hope. Though clearly ―an extraordinary achievement at the time,‖ as
Oscar Schachter has aptly observed, ―[i]n 1948 the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights . . . was cautiously declared to express
aspirations, but not binding law.‖3 In its initial, fundamental
conception, therefore, the Declaration did not purport to create
binding norms even in the international legal system, a point U.S.
American courts have emphasized with regularity.4
But aspirations, especially those solemnly declared, can plant the
seeds of fundamental change. And as we reflect on the occasion of
its 60th anniversary, by all appearances the seeds sown by the solemn
aspirations of the Universal Declaration have already propelled quite
remarkable changes in perspectives and even law itself. In a
substantive sense, the Declaration has inspired progressive growth in
a variety of more specific fields of human rights law at an
international level, as the papers prepared for the other panels in this
Conference explore in more detail. To be sure, the substantive
domestic law effect of even these second generation human rights
efforts remains uneven.5
But what the drafters of the Declaration may not have anticipated

2. THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 5th prtg.
1999).
3. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 17 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004) (―[T]he Declaration
does not of its own force impose obligations as a matter of international law.‖); Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the Universal Declaration
does not reflect customary international law because it is merely aspirational in nature); TelOren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declaring that the
UDHR is a merely ―precatory‖ document, designed as a statement of ideals and aspirations
that does not create any legal obligations); Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988,
1010 (S.D. Ind. 2007) (observing that the Declaration has only ―moral authority‖ and has no
legally binding force).
5. See infra note 9 and accompanying text (relating, as an example, the experience in the
United States with the ICCPR and the ICESCR).
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is how broadly and fundamentally domestic constitutional systems
have subsequently adapted to embrace international law in general,
and in some cases even the Universal Declaration in particular. My
goal here is to set the framework for understanding the significance
of these changes in domestic constitutional law in the sixty years
since the adoption of the Universal Declaration. In specific, I will
trace below how, in numerous respects, the strikingly varied
constitutional systems of the world now share some structural
similarities on the direct reception of international law in, or as,
domestic law.
Indeed, this has become a common, express feature when drafters
set about crafting modern constitutions. But the direct enforcement
of customary international law by domestic courts and other legal
institutions is not limited to these innovative, modern systems. It is
also now an accepted principle in the interpretation of many longestablished constitutional systems, even those firmly entrenched in
the dualist tradition. Though by no means a universal phenomenon,
the extent of this modern trend is worthy of emphasis on an important
occasion such as this anniversary.
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION IN LEGAL CONTEXT
The Universal Declaration came into being in the context of a
structural challenge for the actual enforcement of the international
human ―rights‖ it sought to define and protect. Even in the modern
age of the middle of the last century, the basic premise of the
traditional international legal system was that states, and states alone,
were both its subjects and objects. States could, of course, bind
themselves by conventional international law to protect the rights of
individuals—and in certain limited spheres states have done just that
for some time.6 At particular points, customary international law
likewise created obligations that ran in favor of individuals and
against states. Stated in broad terms, the fundamental goal of the
Universal Declaration was to expand these examples to the broad
6. A prominent example of states agreeing by treaty to create directly enforceable rights
in favor of individuals is found in so-called treaties of ―amity, commerce and navigation,‖
which have existed for well over two centuries. For the United States see, for example, the
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 18, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; and
the Treaty of Friendship, Limits and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 Stat. 138.
Over sixty such treaties are now in force for the United States alone. See note following 8
U.S.C. 1101 (2003) (listing such treaties).
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field of international human rights, both by inspiring express
adoption in future formal treaties and by initiating the dialogue and
actions necessary for the recognition of customary international law.
The challenge arose, however, with the forum for the vindication
of those individual rights. Absent express consent, international law
generally required states neither to submit to suits by individuals in
foreign courts nor to open their own for the same purpose—par in
parem non habet jurisdictionem, as the traditional Latin phrase runs.
To be sure, international juridical institutions such as the International Court of Justice could declare the violation of individual
rights by states under international law. But without more effective
enforcement mechanisms at the international level, the force of these
individual rights in practical terms depended on their reception as law
in domestic legal systems. The challenge, in other words, was
whether the individual rights secured in international law were
subject to direct recognition and enforcement in domestic courts at
the behest of the individuals themselves.
Viewed from the perspective of international human rights law,
the Universal Declaration has had significant influence in the sixty
years since its birth. Thus, for example, subsequent formal treaties
have affirmed some noteworthy aspects of the Universal Declaration,
most notably of course the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights7 and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.8 These treaties in turn have found broad
acceptance at an international level. In the important respect of
propelling the progressive agreement on formal treaties on international human rights law, therefore, the Universal Declaration is
already much of a success.
Even for formal treaties, however, the translation into immediately
enforceable domestic law requires a substantially more nuanced
analysis. For, with quite rare exceptions, domestic constitutions
require some form of formal approval by municipal legislatures
before treaties may function as directly enforceable law. In some
cases and to some extent, domestic courts have directly applied these
subsequent formal treaties to protect individual rights. But more
commonly, notions of ―direct effect‖ or ―self-execution‖ have
functioned as significant impediments to domestic enforcement. And
7. Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
8. Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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in some states, such as the United States, these doctrines have
effectively precluded the direct enforcement even of the second
generation human rights treaties they have expressly ratified.9
My focus here, however, is on the broader and more fundamental
question of the domestic law force of the norms reflected in the
Universal Declaration through their distillation into customary international law. For this form of international law, enforcement by
domestic courts and other institutions depends almost exclusively on
the general approach to the reception of international law by their
respective constitutional systems. And in this respect, the last sixty
years have witnessed some quite interesting developments in modern
constitutional law at the municipal level. As a forthcoming, multicountry work on the subject explores,10 a striking congruence exists
among quite divergent legal systems on the direct applicability of
norms of customary international law the formal sanction of domestic
lawmaking procedures is absent. This principle is particularly true
for constitutions that came into force after the adoption of the
Universal Declaration. But it may surprise that the rules of
customary international law also have a direct effect in a number of
states that hew closely to the traditional dualist separation of
international and domestic law.
In the pages that follow, I will review some of the more
noteworthy examples of this modern development in domestic
constitutional law. These constitutions create a framework for the
enforcement in domestic law of the international human rights the
Universal Declaration originally sought to promote and protect.

9. See, e.g., Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. at 728 (noting that upon ratification the United
States declared that the substantive provisions of the ICCPR ―were not self-executing‖ and
that, therefore, ―the Senate has expressly declined to give the federal courts the task of
interpreting and applying‖ that treaty). Accordingly, federal appellate courts have expressly
refused to give domestic law effect to the ICCPR. See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d
248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001); Buell v. Mitchell, 274 F.3d 337, 371–72 (6th Cir. 2001); Igartua
De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8, 10 n.1 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
10. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement:
Summary and Conclusions, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY (David Sloss ed., forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at sec. II.E., on file
with author).
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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Perhaps the most prominent examples of the international law
friendly constitutions adopted since the end of World War II are
those of Germany, Russia, and South Africa. The German ―Basic
Law‖ (Grundgesetz) of 1949 contains a particularly stark affirmation
of the direct effect of customary international law. Its Article 25
explicitly declares that the ―[t]he general rules of international law
are an integral part of federal law.‖11 Lest there be any doubt, the
same provision emphasizes that such norms ―directly create rights
and duties for the residents‖ of the country.12 Indeed, it also declares
that the general rules of international law even ―take precedence over
statutory law.‖13 A special jurisdictional provision in the Grundgesetz also delegates exclusive authority over issues of customary
international law—and thus over its direct effect in domestic law—to
the German Constitutional Court.14
The South African Constitution of 1996 contains some of the most
detailed provisions on the direct effect and other influence of
international law. A special section directed solely to the subject
(Section 232) declares that ―[c]ustomary international law is law in
the Republic‖15 (although, unlike Germany, such norms of an
international origin must yield to statutory law adopted by the
Parliament16). Separately, the Constitution expressly sets forth an
instruction, which commonly applies in other countries as well, that
domestic courts must prefer an interpretation of legislation ―that is
consistent with international law.‖17 More fundamentally, the
Constitution directs domestic courts to interpret its own Bill of
Rights, which was fashioned around international human rights
documents such as the Universal Declaration, with reference to
11. Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Constitution] art. 25
(F.R.G.) (translation by author).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. art. 100(2) (providing that if any doubt arises in a lower court over ―whether a
rule of international law is part of federal law and whether it directly creates rights and
obligations for individuals,‖ then the court shall refer the matter to the Federal Constitutional
Court) (translation by author).
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 s. 232.
16. Id. (providing that customary international law does not apply if ―it is inconsistent
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament‖).
17. Id. s. 233.
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international law.18
The Russian Federation’s Constitution of 1993 sets forth similarly
broad principles on the direct effect of customary international law.
Article 15(4) of the Constitution declares that, in addition to treaties,
all ―[g]enerally recognized principles and norms of international
law . . . shall be an integral part‖ of the Russian legal system.19
These exemplars of Germany, Russia, and South Africa are by no
means anomalies. Numerous other constitutions adopted or adapted
after the Universal Declaration declare similar principles. A common
feature of these modern constitutions is an express declaration that
customary international law forms a direct part of the country’s
domestic law. The Serbian Constitution of 2006, for example,
declares not only that ―[g]enerally accepted rules of international
law . . . shall be an integral part of the legal system in the Republic of
Serbia,‖ but also that such rules shall be ―applied directly.‖20 The
Greek Constitution of 2001 likewise affirms that ―[t]he generally
recognized rules of international law . . . shall be an integral part of
domestic Greek law.‖21 Indeed, like the German Grundgesetz, the
same provision in the Greek Constitution states that such international law rules ―shall prevail over any contrary provision of the
law.‖22 In the same vein, the Constitution of Austria as reconstituted
in 1945 provides that ―[t]he generally recognized rules of international law . . . shall be an integral part of federal law.‖23 A number
of other constitutions have express provisions to the same effect,
including the Philippines Constitution of 1987,24 the Portuguese
Constitution of 1976,25 the Namibian Constitution of 1990,26 the

18. Id. s. 39 (stating that ―[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum . . . must consider international law‖).
19. Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15(4) (Russ.).
20. Const. of the Republic of Serb. 2006, art. 16.
21. 1975 Syntagma [SYN] art. 28 (Greece).
22. Id.
23. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1930, as last amended
by Bundesgesetz [BG] BGBl I No. 100/2003, art. 9 (Austria).
24. CONST. (1987), Art. II, sec. 2 (Phil.) (―The Philippines . . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land . . . .‖).
25. Const. of the Portuguese Republic 1976, art. 8(1) (―The rules and principles of
general or ordinary international law are an integral part of Portuguese law.‖).
26. Const. of the Republic of Namib. 1990, art. 144 (―Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or Act of Parliament, the general rules of public international law . . . shall form
part of the law of Namibia.‖).
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Slovenian Constitution of 1991,27 and the Estonian Constitution of
1992.28
Similarly directed provisions in other modern constitutions simply
declare that the state must conform to international law. The Polish
Constitution of 1997, for example, proclaims that ―[t]he Republic of
Poland shall respect international law binding upon it.‖29 The Italian
Constitution of 1948 likewise states, in a provision solely directed to
the subject, that ―the legal system of Italy conforms to all generally
recognized principles of international law.‖30 The modern constitutions of Belarus,31 Georgia,32 Hungary,33 and Mongolia34 contain
similar declarations.
Some modern Constitutions have even expressly granted domestic
law force to the Universal Declaration by name. The two most
prominent examples are the Constitutions of Spain and Argentina.
Section 10(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 expressly requires
that the provisions ―relating to the fundamental rights and liberties
recognized by the Constitution shall be construed in conformity with
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.‖35
A special modern amendment to the Constitution of Argentina is
27. Const. of the Republic of Slovenia 1991 (as amended), art. 8 (―Laws and regulations
must comply with generally accepted principles of international law . . . .‖); see also id. art.
153 (―Laws must be in conformity with generally accepted principles of international law.‖).
28. Const. of the Republic of Estonia 1992, art. 3(1) (―Universally recognized principles
and norms of international law shall be an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system.‖);
cf. Const. of the Republic of Bulgaria 1992, art. 149(l)(4) (granting to the Bulgarian Constitutional Court the power to ―rule on the compatibility of domestic laws with the universally
recognized norms of international law‖).
29. Const. of the Republic of Poland 1997, art. 9.
30. COST. [Constitution] art. 10 (Italy).
31. Const. of the Republic of Belarus 1994, art. 8 (―The Republic of Belarus shall
recognize the supremacy of the universally acknowledged principles of international law and
ensure that its laws comply with such principles.‖).
32. Const. of Georgia 1995, art. 6(2) (―The legislation of Georgia shall correspond to
universally recognised principles and rules of international law.‖).
33. A MAGYAR KÖZTÁRSASÁG ALKOTMÁNYA art. 7(1) (Hung.) (―The legal system of the
Republic of Hungary accepts the generally recognized principles of international law, and
shall harmonize the country’s domestic law with the obligations assumed under international
law.‖).
34. Const. of Mongolia 1992, art. 10(1) (―Mongolia adheres to the universally
recognized norms and principles of international law . . .‖).
35. Constitución [C.E.] art. 10(2) (Spain); see also Constitution of the Republic of
Yemen 1994, art. 5 (―The state shall abide by the United Nations Charter, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the Charter of the League of Arab States and the generally
accepted norms of international law.‖).
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even broader. It identifies by name not only the Universal
Declaration, but also a number of the principal international treaties
designed to protect individual and collective human rights. In
specific, a provision on the powers of the Congress of Argentina
proclaims that these named international human rights treaties
together with ―the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . have
constitutional hierarchy in the full force of their provisions.‖36
Although they do not supplant other constitutional principles, these
international law norms ―are to be understood as complementing the
rights and guarantees recognized‖ in the Constitution.37 The same
provision then entrenches the rights in the Universal Declaration and
the other identified instruments by establishing a special two-thirds
voting requirement in both houses of the national legislature for any
attempt at denunciation.38
Interestingly, even some states that follow a purer dualist approach
to the interaction of international treaties and domestic law have
recognized the direct effect of customary international law. In broad
terms, this tradition separates international treaty-making by the
national executive from the required domestic treaty-implementation
by the legislature. The states that follow this tradition include
Australia, Canada, India, Israel, and the United Kingdom. Perhaps
ironically, in the forthcoming work on treaty enforcement noted
above,39 the country chapters for all five of these states report that
domestic courts have recognized the direct effect of the rules of
customary international law even without formal endorsement by the
legislature.40
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of India is worthy of
special note in this regard. Under its so-called ―Doctrine of
Incorporation,‖ the rules of customary international law have direct
and automatic effect in the domestic legal system of India.41 This
principle follows from the reasoning that the state policy of India as
reflected in its Constitution favors domestic law compliance with the
country’s international obligations. As the Indian Supreme Court
thus declared in a landmark ruling of 1984, ―[t]he comity of nations
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Constitución Argentina [CONST. ARG.] sec. 75(22).
Id.
Id.
See Van Alstine, supra note 10, sec. II.E.
Id.
See id. (summarizing the more detailed review in the chapter for India).
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requires that rules of international law may be accommodated in the
municipal law even without express legislative sanction, provided
they do not run into conflict with Acts of Parliament.‖42
Unfortunately, the approach of the United States to the direct effect
of customary international law is subject to some doubt. The wellknown and long-accepted view, as reflected in the famous Paquete
Habana case of 1900, is that ―international law is part of our law.‖43
But more modern Supreme Court opinions have left some confusion
in their wake. The Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain,44 for example, quoted The Paquete Habana’s famous
declaration with approval.45 But it did not then simply apply
customary international law. Rather, the Court focused narrowly on
the original intent of Congress in adopting the jurisdictional statute at
issue.46 Moreover, in a string of recent cases culminating in Medellín
v. Texas,47 the Supreme Court refused to enforce undisputed
international law obligations of the United States, even those founded
in treaties and expressly declared by the International Court of
Justice.48
This noteworthy distraction aside, the message from a review of
modern constitutional developments is that international law protections of individual rights are finding increasing traction in
domestic law. The progression, to be sure, has been neither uniform
nor linear. And the receptivity to the basic principle has continued to
parallel in an unhealthy way the traditional political, cultural, and
religious fault lines that divide so many other aspects of the modern
world. Easily the most troubling aspect of this division is that in
some measure it arises from the perception—real or imagined—that
customary international law itself reflects the particular value set of
only the industrialized Western world.
Skeptics also justifiably have raised concerns about the absence of

42. See Gramophone Co. of India Ltd. v. Birendra Bahadur Pandey, A.I.R. 1984 S.C.
667 (India).
43. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
44. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
45. Id. at 729.
46. Id. at 720 (concluding based on a review of history that Congress intended the Alien
Tort Statute ―to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations
of the law of nations‖).
47. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
48. Id. at 1356–60.
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fully transparent democratic procedures for the creation and
recognition of non-conventional international human rights norms.
Without formal lawmaking procedures, tyrants may equally well
corrupt law to be a mask for the naked exercise of power with the
refrain, ―international law made me do it.‖ In this way, false ―law‖
risks becoming merely a means for utilizing power to control real
law. Without naming names, careful observers of international
human rights law will rightly question whether some of the states
expressly noted above follow, in actual practice, the solemn
declarations in their constitutions about the domestic force of
customary international law. Moreover, the absence of lawmaking
procedures fully legitimized through democratic processes has led to
well-grounded concerns by some about the power of unelected
domestic judges to recognize as binding non-conventional norms of
international law.
Nonetheless, as the examples reviewed above attest, the last sixty
years have witnessed a discernible and serious trend in domestic
constitutional law toward the express reception of customary
international law in, or as, domestic law. The result of this trend is an
ever firmer framework in domestic law for direct enforcement of
international human rights by domestic institutions, and in particular
domestic courts. In other words, an ever greater number of domestic
constitutions—through their reception of customary international
law—now provide a mechanism for individuals to vindicate the
individual rights recognized on an international law level directly
against their state’s instrumentalities on a domestic level.
CONCLUSION
I do not mean to suggest here that the Universal Declaration now
exists in some Panglossian world of fully and immediately protected
international human rights.49 For one thing, a fine-grained appreciation of the actual enforcement of human rights depends as much on
the attitude of the domestic judges ―in the trenches‖ as it does on
broad constitutional structures. Moreover, as the other authors on the
panel entitled ―The Influence of the Universal Declaration as Law‖
have observed, even today international human rights law faces
49. See FRANÇOIS-MARIE AROUET DE VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE, OR OPTIMISM 293 (1759)
(containing the famous optimistic statement by Dr. Pangloss at the very end of the book that
―there is a concatenation of all events in the best of possible worlds‖).
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significant challenges from countervailing political forces (such as
executive branch responses to terrorism). For these and myriad other
reasons, therefore, I acknowledge immediately that significant
challenges remain for the international acceptance of the rights
declared by the Universal Declaration sixty years ago and in
particular for their regular, uniform, and direct enforcement in
domestic law.
Nonetheless, one can say with some level of comfort that the hope
that animated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sixty years
ago is even more justified today. Through its solemnly declared
aspirations, the Declaration has already accomplished much toward
propelling the international community to protect human rights in
law. And the noteworthy developments in domestic constitutional
law briefly reviewed here have increasingly created a framework for
the direct enforcement of those rights in domestic law. Though by no
means universal, in short, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has already provided convincing evidence that aspirations can indeed
drive law and law can control power.

